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Abstract
What drives extreme economic events? Motivated by recent theory, and events in
US subprime markets, we begin to open the black box of extremes. Specifically, we
extend standard economic analysis of extreme risk, allowing for dynamics and endo-
geneity. We explain how endogenous extremes may arise in an economy of individuals
who engage in resource transfers. Our model suggests that susceptibility to extremes
depends on differences in marginal substitution rates. Using over a century of daily
stock price data, we construct empirical probabilities of extremes, and document inter-
esting dynamic behavior. We find evidence that extremes are endogenous. This latter
finding raises the possibility that control of extremes is a public good, and that extreme
events may be an important market failure for regulators and central banks to correct.
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1 Introduction and Literature Review
For whoever knows the ways of Nature will more easily notice her deviations;
and ... whoever knows her deviations will more accurately describe her ways.
F. Bacon: New Organum.
1.1 Introduction
Extreme events often seem unpredictable, but are they? This paper proposes a positive
theory of extremes, based on externalities. A major motivation for this work is our obser-
vation of two salient aspects of modern financial markets: dynamics and endogeneity in
extremes. By dynamics, we refer to recurring episodes of ’surprise’ extreme events. By
endogeneity, we refer to the effect of economic agents on changing the likelihood of ex-
tremes.1 The costs of extreme events can be prohibitive, including the risk of default, and
an impaired trading process because prices are relatively uninformative. Extreme events
also carry social and psychological costs, such as increased Knightian uncertainty in an
unstable economy.2
Discussions of extreme economic events often assume that they are generated exogenously
by nature, and have a constant probability of occurrence.3 But do we sometimes observe
spikes in the frequency of extremes? And is the likelihood of extreme events affected,
at times, by our behavior? The answer to both questions is yes. Dynamic, endogenous
extremes occur in economics and in nature, including the effect of human activity on the
likelihood of extreme financial events, and on extreme climate changes.4 In this paper,
we explore a possible explanation for endogenous extremes, namely, externality effects.
Externalities occur when one agent’s actions directly affect the environment of other agents.
Financial crises and extremes have externality features, since they affect many individuals
in the national or global financial system, even though often precipitated by a small number
1Endogenous extremes could be due to agents’ negligence, bounded rationality, excessive risk taking, or
corruption.
2See Harris (2003), chapter 9; Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2007); and Weitzman (2007).
3See Barro (2006) and Friedman and Laibson (1989).
4For extremes in economics, see Fisher (1933) and Grossman (1988). For extremes in nature, see Below,
Guha-Sapir, Hoyois, and Scheuren (2007); and Stern (2007).
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of individuals. It is well known that externalities cause inefficiency of the price system.5
Consequently, if extreme events are due to externalities, society may not pay the appropriate
price for the extremes that it generates.
How does this formulation of extreme externalities help us? It does so in three ways. First,
it allows us to understand the origin of some extremes (the endogenous ones), thereby giv-
ing us insight into which we can plausibly try to avert. Second, it gives banks and regulatory
authorities an additional set of tools from public finance–subsidies, property rights, and so
on–that may help to address extreme events before and during their occurrence. Finally, as
noted by Allen and Gale (2007), contemporary economics does not show a specific market
failure that central banks and regulators can correct by their intervention. Our formula-
tion may provide a starting point for the role of government, since it emphasizes a clear
market failure, namely the externality from agents’ neglect to consider their impact on the
likelihood of extremes.
In addition to being of academic and policy relevance, this paper may have immediate
lessons for market participants, since financial markets have recently featured a large num-
ber of extreme events. In the spring and summer of 2007, the aftershock from the subprime
market, a relatively small part of US financial markets, reached over to touch hedge funds
and international markets. In the US, credit spreads widened ominously, even for safer
debt, and the housing market reached record breaking levels. For example, as shown in
Figure 1, the percentage change in the Case-Shiller index reached both its historical (20-
year) maximum of nearly 16% in 2005 and its historical minimum of -4.52% in the third
quarter of 2007. In Britain the interbank rate reached its highest level in 9 years, as shown
in Figure 2. One of the more outstanding examples occurred in July and August of 2007,
when hedge funds suffered such severe losses that Goldman Sachs, in a one-of-a-kind inter-
vention, had to infuse US$3 billion into one of its funds, Global Equity Opportunities. This
fund lost 30 per cent of its value in the week between August 3 and August 10. A major
reason cited for the severe hedge fund losses was that the extremes occurring in markets
were ’25 standard deviation’ events (New York Times, August 13, 2007). Such incidents
are puzzling because hedge funds did not seem directly exposed to heavy enough risk to
warrant such drops in value. Moreover, most large investors have risk management systems
that are stress tested against extreme market events such as terrorism risk, banking crises,
and interest rate changes. So what sort of event could surprise such respected investors
5For textbook expositions of externalities, see Harris (2003), Chapter 9; Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green
(1995); and Varian (1992). For related economic work on aggregate effects of externalities, see Blanchard
and Kiyotaki (1987).
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enough to lose as much as one-third of their value? A potential answer is that our approach
to understanding surprise extreme events is incomplete. This incompleteness may stem
from the fact that both information economics and current risk management are generally
silent about time variation and endogeneity in the likelihood of extremes.
In light of the preceding observations, we extend existing theory to include explicit, pos-
itive analysis of extremes, which are dynamic and endogenous. It should be noted that a
type of endogeneity is recognized in certain spheres of risk analysis. Information theory ac-
knowledges that individual agents’ behavior can affect individual outcomes in settings such
as insurance markets. However, this framework is usually restricted to individual agents or
sectors, and typically requires asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders.6 In
our model, we illustrate that under some conditions, endogenous risk effects can spill over
to other sectors even in the absence of asymmetric information. A graphical depiction of
our approach is in Table 1. This table shows that our view of endogenous probability is
similar to that of moral hazard. The difference is that we consider broader settings, where
there may be spillovers and general information structures.
1.2 Literature Review
Our research relates to existing work on extreme events and externalities. Regarding ex-
treme events, there are several recent papers. Barro (2006) constructs a Lucas (1978) model
with rare extreme events. Upon calibrating the model to twentieth century data, Barro
(2006) finds that it allows him to address the equity premium and riskfree rate puzzles.
Weitzman (2007) develops a Bayesian model of asset returns. He discovers that when
agents consider the possibility of extremes, there is a reversal of all the major asset pricing
puzzles. Chichilnisky and Wu (2006) present a model of endogenous uncertainty where
increased financial innovation leads to greater likelihood of default. Chichilnisky (2007)
shows that by axiomatically extending expected utility to account for extreme responses
to extreme events, we can overcome decision theory paradoxes due to Allais (1953) and
Ellsberg (1961). Montier (2002) discusses the notion that crashes and outliers are endoge-
nous, perhaps due to a preponderance of sellers relative to buyers. Danielsson and Shin
(2003) model a scenario where unanticipated coordination of agents’ behavior leads to
6The current financial issues, however, potentially affect numerous sectors and regions. Moreover, espe-
cially in the case of subprime mortgages, it is difficult to argue that lenders were oblivious to asymmetric
information issues, and did not understand the potential for default when supplying loans to borrowers with
poor credit history or no collateral.
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an endogenous increase in risk. The research of Bazerman and Watkins (2004) suggests
that certain ’surprise’ events in modern society are predictable, since there may exist suffi-
cient information to know that these events are imminent. Gabaix, Gopikrishnan, Plerou,
and Stanley (2006) develop a theory of stock volatility, where the driving force is trading
by large investors, during illiquid markets. Regarding externality effects, two important
strands of related work concern theories of corruption and tax evasion, and bubbles and
crises. Andvig and Moene (1990) show that supply of corruption increases due to lower
moral costs of taking bribes. Sandmo (2005) discusses the possibility, based on a ’social
conscience’ argument, that tax evasion for an individual taxpayer is less risky, the more
other taxpayers are perceived as evading taxes. Allen and Gale (2007) discuss the notion
that bubbles may be precipitated by incentive and limited liability issues, which reduce the
costs of individual risk taking. The authors note that currently there is little theory guiding
financial regulation. In chapter 7, Allen and Gale (2007) suggest that there is not always a
clear market failure for regulators to correct, in the case of market instability.
Our paper is similar to the above papers in that we discuss the importance of extreme risk
and externalities in socioeconomic life. However, our work differs in several respects. First,
unlike previous research, we allow for extremes to be dynamic and endogenous. Specif-
ically, we derive mathematical expressions to characterize the ’signature’ of dynamic, en-
dogenous extremes. Second, we develop a simple model explaining the propagation of
endogenous extremes. Third, we apply the insights from our model to US stock market
data, providing evidence on dynamics and endogeneity in market extremes. Finally, the
model allows us to rationalize government intervention in the financial economy, and to
discuss new policy solutions to extreme events, using a standard public finance toolkit. The
remainder of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 discusses dynamic
extreme events. Section 3 presents a simple, stylized approach to analyzing dynamic, en-
dogenous extremes. Section 4 reports the results of our empirical application, and Section
5 concludes.
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2 Dynamic Extremes
2.1 Definitions
Extreme events occur in many disciplines. Each has developed its own terminology, which
may be incompatible with that of other disciplines.7 We therefore require a common lan-
guage for extremes, since they arise in a wide variety of settings. Possessing a common
language, we can contemplate describing, forecasting and controlling extremes, a task that
we begin to pursue in the next section. Based on previous research as well as what we feel
to be intuitively sensible aspects of extremes, we now develop a taxonomy. Given the focus
of this paper, we use definitions for quantitative data, such as security returns. Intuitively,
extreme events are far away from what is normal. In the spirit of previous research such as
de Haan and Ferreira (2006) and Friedman and Laibson (1989) we may say, heuristically,
that extreme events are ’far away’ from the median of the relevant dataset. Armed with this
heuristic description, we suggest the following taxonomy.
Consider a variable X with domain X ⊂ R. Define a relevant sample Xs ⊆ X, comprising
n realizations of this variable, Xs = X1, ...Xn, with median X¯s, and standard deviation
σs. If Xs is a time series, assume that the relevant sample data are covariance stationary.
Below, the superscript E indicates ’extreme’.
Definition 1: An ω-Extreme event XE(ω) is an event that is at least ω ≥ 1 standard
deviations away from X¯s, the relevant median:
|XE(ω) − X¯s| ≥ ωσs.
We can now implement a workable definition of the empirical probability of extremes, pi.
7The concept of rare or extreme event is used in at least four ways in decision-related sciences. First, in
statistics and econometrics, rare refers to a record-breaking phenomenon, one that has never occurred before
(de Haan and Sinha (1999)). Second, in political science, it denotes a low probability event with a high
impact, which may have occurred before (King and Zeng (2001)). Third, in the theory of risky choice, it
refers to a low probability event, which may have occurred before, but not necessarily with a high impact
(Hertwig, Barron, Weber, and Erev (2005)). Fourth, in finance the closely related peso problem denotes an
infrequent regime that is unobserved but anticipated by economic agents (Evans (1996)).
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Definition 2: The Empirical probability pi(ω) of an ω-extreme event XE(ω) measures
the relative frequency of observations exceeding ω standard deviations from the relevant
median X¯s:
pi(ω) =
Number of [Xi ∈ Xs : |Xi − X¯s| ≥ ωσs]
Number of Xi ∈ Xs
.
Our definitions are conditional in two respects. We condition on the degree of extremeness
ω that we wish to consider. We also condition on the relevant data sample, which is chosen
with the guidance of scientific theory and knowledge of the question at hand. Evidently
what is extreme may change over time, and our definions capture this aspect. For finan-
cial time series, the benchmark median X¯s can be computed dynamically, to capture the
notion that over time, what once was extreme may become commonplace, and vice versa.8
This approach makes sense from a social science perspective, acknowledging that when the
world changes, individuals take some time to recognize and respond. The conditional ap-
proach is a potential challenge and strength. A challenge is possible lack of comparability
across different studies.9 The strength is that it frees researchers in various disciplines or
with different questions to choose, clearly, their concept of extremeness, with alternative
samples and values of ω.
Our taxonomy builds on and generalizes existing research. Our definitions compare current
events to past medians because individuals’ notions of extreme are often relative to what
they learned previously. This builds on psychology research, where individuals take time to
learn about rare events by experience (Hertwig, Barron, Weber, and Erev (2005) and Weber
(2006)), or have disaster myopia (Herring and Wachter (2005)). It also builds on econo-
metric considerations, since individuals gather data at the end of the period before they
can compute sample statistics. Our definitions are related to extreme value theory, where
extremes are usually phrased in terms of closeness to the maximum or minimum. We use
the median instead of the mean or extrema for statistical and psychological reasons. Statis-
tically speaking, the median is robust and achieves the highest possible breakdown value.10
Psychologically, individuals may take time to adjust their reference points, and the median
embodies this more than the mean.11 We choose a slightly more general definition than in
8One could calculate extremes relative to the previous quarter’s benchmark median, to capture individ-
uals’ lag time in learning and computing the benchmark. The notation ω is chosen since it is often used in
definitions of oscillation.
9 If comparability is an issue, one might compare extreme estimates using both the data sample suggested
by scientific theory and the entire data available.
10See Casella and Berger (1990) page 230.
11For research on endogenous reference points for individuals, see Frydman and Goldberg (2007), chapter
9, and the references therein.
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extreme value theory because economic agents might worry about events that deviate from
what is typical, even if those events are not record-breaking. For large ω, Definition 1 will
be identical to that of extreme value theory, by selecting ω such that ωσs = |X(1) − X¯s|,
where X(1) is an extreme order statistic. Finally, our definition is flexible and does not
assume extreme events are infrequent. This property is attractive because it permits the
possibility of extreme clusters, where extreme events occur relatively frequently.12
2.2 Static versus Dynamic Extremes
Economic applications often implicitly assume a constant likelihood of extremes, which
is useful for analytical tractability. Evidently economic systems change and grow over
time, which may affect the probability of extremes. There is some evidence that extreme
probabilities change over time, such as record-breaking stock market levels in the 1990s,
and oil prices in 2007 to 2008. For economic agents the likelihood of large price deviations
is very important to estimate. A mistaken assumption of constant likelihood of extreme
price changes is clearly dangerous at many levels, to central bankers as well as individual
and institutional investors. Thus, we allow the temporal nature of extremes to be static or
dynamic. For static extremes, the likelihood pit is constant, pit = pi for all time periods t.
Dynamic extremes, by contrast, can be of two varieties, either random or with a discernible
pattern. The random case is represented by equation (1) below. In order to obtain bounded
probabilities, consider a random variable zt and pit, related in the following manner:

 zt = zt−1 + εtpit = exp (zt)1+exp (zt) , (1)
where εt ∼ i.i.d N(0, γ), with γ > 0.
Patterns have many possible representations. Concretely, consider a simple stationary au-
toregressive representation, pit = α +
J∑
j=1
θjpit−j + εt. For parsimony, we focus on the first
order case:
pit = α + θ1pit−1 + εt, (2)
12During bubbles or periods of high financial market volatility, stock and commodity indices may reach
levels far from the recent median, routinely. For highly skewed or heavy-tailed distributions, extremes can
occur more frequently than central observations.
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where |θ1| < 1. Expression (2) permits us to capture potential clustering in extremes.13
What is the signature of dynamic extremes? According to equations (1) and (2), dynamic
exogenous extremes have a frequency pit that depends either on a random arrival εt, or else
on some function of its own past values.
3 A Simple Model of Endogenous Extremes
3.1 Exogenous versus Endogenous Extremes
Extreme probabilities can be exogenous or endogenous, each with a different policy re-
sponse.14 Exogenous extremes arrive from outside the economic system and are truly acts
of nature, from the perspective of the domestic economy. For example, in a crop-based
economy, the probability pi of extreme changes in crop value could depend on exogenous
swings in weather.15 Since weather is generally unpredictable beyond a few days, and ex-
ogenous to an individual farmer, we can represent the probability of extremes as essentially
random, as in equation (1).
Endogenous extremes, by contrast, are generated and perhaps amplified within the eco-
nomic system, by agents’ activity and interaction. This activity persists because extremes
have externality-like attributes, and therefore agents may ’over-produce’ the amount of ex-
tremes in the system. For example, stock market crashes and banking panics may stem
from excessive risk taking and borrowing of a segment of the economy (Fisher (1933)), ex-
cessive credit creation (Allen and Gale (2000)), and excessive reliance on computer-based
trading (Grossman (1988)).16 Since each agent has an incentive to borrow or risk too much
13The focus of our discussion is on empirical properties of pit. Therefore, the regression residual ε in
(2) must be compatible with bounded probabilities, because the pit data used in our estimation will lie in
the [0,1] interval. If modeling theoretical properties of the process, we could impose boundedness by using
some variant of a logistic function, as in (1). We could also consider nonstationary models, such as regime
switches.
14 In practice, there is a spectrum of extremes, with some being a mixture of exogenous and endogenous.
The tools developed herein help us to assess the dominant influence on extremes.
15Other causes of exogenous extremes include foreign wars, natural catastrophes, and uncertainty about
new technology.
16The above authors consider some form of extreme event or crisis, but vary in their emphasis on endo-
geneity. Some model a closed economy or a single sector, others an international setting. The applications
differ, although endogeneity or externality issues are common to all. Our paper seems to be the first to use
this framework explicitly in a general setting.
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from the social point of view, competition leads to overproduction of extremes. Hence,
the probability of extremes may no longer be random as in (1). We develop the relevant
expression for this latter case below.
While exogenous extremes are statistically unrelated to the economic environment, en-
dogenous extremes (since they are generated by economic agents) should be related to the
optimizing or equilibrium behavior of agents. We focus on a canonical form of economic
interaction, namely transfer of resources.17 The heart of the externality is as follows. A
key feature of modern financial markets is that they enhance agents’ ability to transfer
resources, which involves either trading commodities and assets or moving assets across
time. This transfer of resources can aid or harm other individuals not party to the transfer.
For example, massive stock sales by some investors can decrease the stock price, thereby
increasing market volatility and diminishing portfolio values of all other investors who own
that stock.18 In similar vein, excessive borrowing by a relatively small set of investors can
increase the likelihood of a systemwide market crash.19 Hence the behavior of individual
agents may inherently affect the wellbeing of others without being reflected in a price–the
definition of an externality. In sum, modern markets confer ability to transfer financial
resources easily, but may bear hidden costs in the form of externalities.20
Therefore an important externality from resource transfers involves the likelihood pit of
extreme events or large price changes. We take this externality as the starting point of our
paper.21 Even though agents realize that their collective behavior raises the likelihood pit of
extremes, they may persist in that behavior, since they do not bear all the costs of extreme
events.
17Resource transfers include such activities as borrowing funds, and trading commodities or securities.
18See Gabaix, Gopikrishnan, Plerou, and Stanley (2006).
19Allen and Gale (2007), Fisher (1933), Minsky (1982) and Montier (2002), discuss the fact that large
asset price and output fluctuations for the entire economy may result from various forms of resource transfers
within specific sectors–increased trading, increased desire to liquidate assets, and increased borrowing.
20The externality costs of large resource transfers for an individual depend on the dominant social attitude
towards transfers at the particular time. Thus, there might be zero or even negative perceived costs of trans-
ferring resources during the upswing in asset cycles. There is also evidence of different attitudes by the same
individuals at different stages of their life cycles, see Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and Laibson (2007). Learn-
ing may not occur, since different generations of individuals are involved. For related ideas, see Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) and Minsky (1982).
21We focus on the likelihood of extremes. For work on the structure of specific extreme events, see Abreu
and Brunnermeier (2003) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005). For work discussing rational individuals’
perception of extreme risk, see Weitzman (2007).
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3.2 Basic Framework
The purpose of the following example is solely to fix ideas. Consider an economy popu-
lated by 2 agents with differentiated resource or wealth endowments, who use the financial
system to transfer resources between themselves. Suppose that Agents 1 and 2 transfer re-
sources to each other in the amounts r1 and r2, recognizing that these transfers might raise
the likelihood pi of extreme events. Below, we show that, under fairly moderate assump-
tions, the likelihood of extremes in this economy is socially inefficient.
In order to model the reality that resource transfers enhance individual agents’ wellbeing,
let each agent i have a neoclassical utility function ui(ri), with u′i(ri) > 0, for i = 1, 2.22
The more agents engage in resource transfers such as excessive borrowing or investing
in risky securities, the more likely it is that asset prices reach an extremely high level,
affecting the entire system. Thus, let pi(r1, r2) be the likelihood of such extreme events,
with ∂pi(r1, r2)/∂ri > 0, i = 1, 2. Let c1 and c2 be the costs of extreme events, net of
interest, for Agents 1 and 2, respectively. With probability 1−pi(r1, r2) there is no extreme
event and each agent receives 0 net. Agents derive utility from transferring resources, but
dislike the costs imposed on them by extreme events.23 Agent 1′s utility maximization
problem is
max
r1
u(r1)− pi(r1, r2)c1.
The first order conditions are given by u′(r1)− ∂pi(r1,r2)∂r1 · c1 = 0, which can be rewritten as
∂pi(r1, r2)
∂r1
=
u′(r1)
c1
. (3)
This equation says that sensitivity of the probability of extreme events to increased resource
transfers is proportional to Agent 1’s marginal utility, and depends inversely on her costs
during extreme events.
By contrast, from society’s point of view, the relevant optimization problem has to account
for all the costs to society, both c1 and c2. Therefore, the social problem is
max
r1
u(r1)− pi(r1, r2)[c1 + c2].
22By neoclassical utility, we signify strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable utility, which
represents locally nonsatiated preferences. This is similar to the usage in Allen and Gale (2007), chapter 3.
23Financial costs of extremes include risk of default and an impaired financial system. Social and psycho-
logical costs include increased Knightian uncertainty in an unstable economy.
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Now the first order conditions are given by u′(r1)− ∂pi(r1,r2)∂r1 · (c1 + c2) = 0, which can be
rewritten as
∂pi(r1, r2)
∂r1
=
u′(r1)
c1 + c2
. (4)
The numbers on the right hand side in equation (4) will be smaller than before, in (3),
because the denominator is larger. Intuitively, by neglecting to account for the full cost of
extreme events, individuals might choose excessive amounts of financial resource transfers.
Hence, susceptibility of the economy to increased extremes will be excessively large.
3.3 A Dynamic Model
We now develop a more realistic model, where resources may also be transferred over
time, instead of only from one agent to another. We also account for resource constraints.
For concreteness, let the two main types of agents each conduct only one type of resource
transfer–only selling and buying. We call these agents sellers and buyers, respectively.
Consider an economy with a large number of buyers and a large number of sellers. The
transfer of resources may affect other agents in the economy, including other buyers, sellers,
banks and investors, domestically and internationally. We denote these other agents by O,
for other. In the following analysis we use subscripts 0, 1 and 2 to index variables pertaining
to other, sellers and buyers, respectively.
Sellers and buyers are both in the market for transferring resources. Effective supply of
resources by sellers is r1 and demand for resources by buyers is r2. The framework is a
two-period economy, where the first period is t and the second period is t + 1, in order to
distinguish subscripts that refer to time from those that refer to agents. In the first period
sellers and buyers interact and transfer resources. In the second period, sellers are repaid
with interest r1,t · (1 + i), and buyers repay the resources, r2,t · (1 + i), where i is the
prevailing interest rate. The timeline for decisions is shown in Figure 3. For simplicity,
assume that agents receive all their wealth and make all their repayments in the second
period.24 Thus, the seller’s and buyer’s wealth levels in the first period completely derive
from resource transfers: w1,t = −r1,t, and w2,t = r2,t, respectively. In the second period
t+ 1, the buyer and seller receive exogenous wealth endowments w¯1 and w¯2, respectively.
We focus on representative sellers and buyers with neoclassical utility functions u1 and u2,
respectively, which depend on wealth: ui = ui(wi), where u′i(wi) > 0, i = 1, 2. To control
24This timing allows us to model the feature of using financial markets to transfer wealth over time.
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for contemporaneous costs, we consider utility to be net of current costs. Each agent knows
there is a possibility of systemwide extreme events, captured by the probability pi, whose
functional form is common knowledge. There is no asymmetric information regarding
the likelihood of extremes.25 The probability of future extreme events increases with the
average level of current resource transfers, pit+1 = pit+1(r1,t, r2,t), where ∂pit+1/∂ri,t > 0,
i = 1, 2.26 If an extreme event occurs in the future, agent i incurs a positive cost ci,t+1,
i = 0, 1, 2.27
Consider the seller’s problem. Given an interest rate i, at period t the seller decides how
much resources to transfer this period by maximizing utility subject to the following wealth
constraint, which accounts for the possibility of costly extreme events:
w1,t+1 ≥ w¯1 + pit+1(r1,t, r2,t)[r1,t · (1 + i)− c1,t+1] + [1− pit+1(r1,t, r2,t)][r1,t · (1 + i)].
Given locally nonsatiated preferences, this constraint holds as an equality, which simplifies
to w1,t+1 = w¯1+r1,t · (1+ i)−pit+1(r1,t, r2,t) · c1,t+1. Using β to denote the discount factor,
the seller’s problem is:
maxr1 u1(w1,t) + βu1(w1,t+1), s.t.
w1,t = −r1,t
w1,t+1 = w¯1 + r1,t · (1 + i)− pit+1(r1,t, r2,t) · c1,t+1.
After substituting the constraints into the utility arguments, first order conditions for an
interior solution are −u′1(w1,t) + βu′1(w1,t+1)[(1 + i) −
∂pit+1(r1,t,r2,t)
∂r1,t
· c1,t+1] = 0, which
can be rewritten as
∂pit+1(r1,t, r2,t)
∂r1,t
= −
u′1(w1,t)
βu′1(w1,t+1) · c1,t+1
+
1 + i
c1,t+1
. (5)
25Similar assumptions occur in many other economic contexts, such as the idea of price taking, competitive
agents used in Arrow and Debreu (1954), Chichilnisky and Wu (2006) and Debreu (1959), even though the
demand of each agent will affect the price to some extent. Such myopic behavior can be found in other rational
settings: investors with log utility decide their portfolios without reference to future investment opportunities,
see Ingersoll (1987), chapter 11.
26 This summarizes the intuition that excessive resource transfers are destabilizing, without emphasizing
the particular channel of destabilization. Channels through which resource transfers lead to increased likeli-
hood of extremes are explored by a number of authors, including Fisher (1933) and Allen and Gale (2000).
27This cost is financial, social and psychological discomfort suffered in an environment of extremes or
financial instability.
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Equation (5) says that optimally the (derivative of) extreme probability is related to the
marginal rate of substitution for transferring resources between periods t and t + 1, dis-
counted by expected costs. Since the first term of the right hand side of (5) depends on
r1,t via the budget constraint, it follows that extreme probabilities respond to variables af-
fecting the level of resource transfers. We will use this result to motivate our selection of
instruments in the empirical application of Section 4.
Similarly, the buyer’s problem is
maxr2 u2(w2,t) + βu2(w2,t+1), s.t.
w2,t = r2,t
w2,t+1 = w¯2 − r2,t · (1 + i)− pit+1(r1,t, r2,t) · c2,t+1,
which yields first order conditions that can be rewritten as
∂pit+1(r1,t, r2,t)
∂r2,t
=
u′2(w2,t)
βu′2(w2,t+1) · c2,t+1
−
1 + i
c2,t+1
. (6)
As in equation (5), the above expression implies that the future probability of extremes is
potentially dynamic, and depends on the current level of resource transfers.
Equilibrium: In equilibrium, the demand and supply of resource transfers will be equal,
r1 = r2 ≡ r. For illustrative purposes, consider a symmetric equilibrium where buyers and
sellers have identical utility functions and costs, u1 = u2 = u, and c1 = c2 = c. Assume
this symmetry, and equate the optimality conditions for the seller and buyer in (5) and (6):
− u
′(w1,t)
βu′(w1,t+1)·ct+1
+ 1+i
ct+1
= u
′(w2,t)
βu′(w2,t+1)·ct+1
− 1+i
ct+1
. This implies
1 + i =
1
2β
[
u′(w1,t)
u′(w1,t+1)
+
u′(w2,t)
u′(w2,t+1)
]
.
Substituting this expression in equation (6) and simplifying, we obtain that in equilibrium,
extreme probabilities pit+1 satisfy
∂pit+1
∂rt
=
1
2βct+1
[
u′(w2,t)
u′(w2,t+1)
−
u′(w1,t)
u′(w1,t+1)
]
(7)
Equation (7) constitutes the signature of endogenous extremes. Somewhat surprisingly, the
responsiveness of extreme probability to resource transfers is proportional to the differen-
tial in marginal rates of substitution for agents in the corresponding market. When there
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is a big difference in marginal rates of substitutions between borrowers and lenders, the
susceptibility to extreme events is higher.28 As before, the extreme probability is dynamic:
it depends directly on the expected costs of extremes, and indirectly (with indeterminate
sign) on the equilibrium level of resource transfers via the budget constraint. If extremes
were truly exogenous, there would be no statistical relation between extreme probability
and r, and ∂pi(rt+1)
∂rt
= 0. Thus, the distance of the right side of (7) from zero gives a sense
of the error from assuming extremes are exogenous, when they are in reality endogenous.
Social Optimum. To see that the likelihood of extremes is excessive, we proceed as in
section 3.2. Suppose the seller considers the effect of her selling on other agents O, and
therefore internalizes the costs c0,t+1. Her problem is similar to that preceding equation (5),
except that the second budget constraint becomes
w1,t+1 = w¯1 + r1,t · (1 + i)− pit+1(r1,t, r2,t) · (c0,t+1 + c1,t+1).
Solving the first order conditions and rewriting as before, we obtain the counterpart of
equation (5) for a socially optimal level of extremes:
∂pit+1(r1,t, r2,t)
∂r1,t
= −
u′1(w1,t)
βu′1(w1,t+1) · (c0,t+1 + c1,t+1)
+
1 + i
c0,t+1 + c1,t+1
. (8)
The quantities in equations (5) and (8) will differ in general. Thus, when the resource seller
takes into account the future costs of other agents, optimal behavior involves a different
extreme probability for a given level of borrowed funds. It is in this sense that competitive
markets may lead to endogenous, inefficient probability of crashes.29 We are not just saying
there is a link between excessive resource transfers and extremes. Instead, we are showing
that even without asymmetric information, excess transfers may arise as an equilibrium
phenomenon. This phenomenon occurs due to the failure of both resource sellers and
buyers to internalize an important externality, the excessive probability of systemwide,
future financial extremes.
28Intuition for our result is that agents inadvertently affect extreme probability by optimizing over a vari-
able (ri) with external effects. Therefore, optimally their marginal utility relates to the responsiveness of
extreme probability to this variable. Since the marginal rate of substitution depends on resource transfers
through the budget constraint, equation (7) also captures the notion that the easiness of effecting transfers
(loose credit) affects the likelihood of the financial system’s suffering future crashes.
29Note that optimality will not necessarily entail complete elimination of extreme events. Rather, the
extreme probability level is adjusted to the point where the marginal benefit to sellers of an additional unit of
the externality-generating activity, u′
1
(r), equals its marginal cost to other agents, −u′
0
(r).
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To clarify our result, suppose that the terms in equation (8) are all positive, which implies
that the social optimum features relatively lower probability of extremes. There are two
ways to express this situation. First, we can recognize that excessive financial transfers have
a negative externality, and are therefore overproduced. Second, in language perhaps closer
to regulators’ concerns, we can say that financial system stability (control of extremes) is a
public good, which suffers from classic underprovision.
3.4 Model Summary and Implications
We summarize our results from equations (5), (7), and (8) in the following Propositions:
Proposition 1. In an economy with symmetric preferences and nonzero social costs of
extremes, the equilibrium level of extreme probability is in general not socially optimal.
Proposition 2. In an economy with symmetric preferences and nonzero social costs of ex-
tremes, extreme probabilities are potentially dynamic. The sensitivity of extreme probabil-
ities depends indeterminately on equilibrium resource transfers; decreases with expected
costs of extreme events; and increases with the divergence between agents’ marginal rates
of substitution.
These results have implications for regulatory policy and risk management. Proposition 1
suggests, in principle, a role for regulators and central banks to intervene and prevent ex-
cessive financial extremes.30 Proposition 2 cautions risk managers against the assumption
that exposure to extreme events does not change over time. Further, Proposition 2 suggests
possible warning signals for regulators and risk managers–low expected costs and a large
gap between agents’ desires to transfer resources over time.31
More tentatively, the results could also have relevance for current subprime issues. Proposi-
tion 1 may suggest that subprime spillovers can be explained as the result of an externality:
the uninternalized effect of excessive resource transfers on future financial instability. Ac-
cording to Proposition 2, the increased extremes in today’s markets could be driven to some
30Theoretically, regulators could tax ’excessive’ transfers. This would require extensive monitoring of
investors. A more realistic approach might involve reducing demand for excess borrowing by taxing or
subsidizing certain large purchases. Another attractive alternative could be to increase education about costs
of extreme events, and the role individual agents and institutions play in precipitating these costs. This latter
approach is similar to education in recent years about human impact on extremes in the natural environment.
31More generally, Proposition 2 predicts that developments to enhance resource transferrals will, ceteris
paribus, affect the likelihood of extremes. These developments include financial innovation and loose interest
rates.
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extent by low expected costs and a large gap between the marginal rates of substitution for
borrowers and lenders of capital. After expected costs rise and marginal rates of substitu-
tion equalize, then the elevated extremes will begin to play out.
4 Empirical Application
An important pre-condition for the policy analysis described in the previous section is
empirical documentation of the properties of extreme probabilities, to which we now turn.
Since individual asset prices can be driven by idiosyncratic features, we focus on one series
that summarizes aggregate security performance, and for which there is a relatively long
time series of daily observations–the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). Our main series
is the daily DJIA, from May 26, 1896 to September 28, 2007.
We use other variables to investigate endogeneity. From equation (7), extreme probabil-
ities will respond to resource transfers, as well as variables that signal the prevailing so-
cioeconomic attitude towards large resource transfers. In addition, the results of Gabaix,
Gopikrishnan, Plerou, and Stanley (2006) suggest that illiquidity is relevant for predicting
the probability of extremes. We therefore include the following data series: the degree of
securitization in US financial markets (SEC), available from January 1989 to December
2006; the liquidity measure (LIQ) of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) available from April
1962 to December 2006; the value of real estate loans in the US (REALLOAN) available
from January 1947 to July 2007; and a measure of investor sentiment (DSENT1), used in
the study of Baker and Wurgler (2007). The DSENT1 data is available from January 1966
to December 2005, and kindly provided at Professor Jeffrey Wurgler’s website.32 Unless
otherwise noted, these data are of monthly frequency, obtained from WRDS and Datas-
tream. There are three steps to our empirical approach. First, we examine whether our pi
series differ significantly from zero. Second, we explore dynamics by considering autore-
gressive models . Third, we analyze endogeneity by using logistic models. In all cases we
carry out our estimation on several reference periods, imparting some degree of robustness.
32Since the empirical probability series are between 0 and 1, and SEC and REALLOAN are in billions of
dollars, we use percentage changes in SEC and the ratio of real estate loans to total loans, in order to scale
them down comparably.
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4.1 Summary Statistics
The main series we compute is pit(ω), according to Definition 2 in Section 2.1. Using the
DJIA as our base series, we calculate the proportion of times each month that there is an
observation more than ω standard deviations away from the median. Both the median and
standard deviation are computed over the preceding k months, for k = 12, 24, 60 and 120.
This procedure is done on a rolling basis.33 The pit series for the 12 month reference period
is shown in Figure 4. As should be expected, the probability of extremes becomes much
smaller as we move from 1 or 2 sigma events to 3-sigma and beyond. Evidently, the series
move around quite a bit, so even from a visual perspective the series are not constant.
Figures 5 and 6 display histograms of extreme probabilities for 1 and 2 sigma events. In
both cases there is a u-shaped pattern for all reference periods. Moreover, the longer refer-
ence periods tend to have more mass concentrated at 0 and 1. Thus, when economic agents
actually compute extremes in this range (1 and 2 sigma events), their probability estimates
will tend to be more volatile. Figures 7 to 9 show histograms for extreme probabilities of
3- to 5 sigma events. As we would expect, the distributions become more concentrated at
zero, with the shortest horizon (12 months) being the last to have all probabilities at zero.
We now turn to summary statistics and formal tests. Table 2 shows that as the level of ω
increases, both the mean and standard deviation decrease. However, both the t-test and
nonparametric sign rank test generally have minute p-values until the level of ω = 5. This
suggests that the likelihood of extreme events beyond 2 standard deviations may be non-
zero, regardless of agents’ reference periods.
Is there a difference in extreme probabilities within reference periods? We test this hypoth-
esis in Table 3. Except for some marginal significance between 4 and 5 sigma events, there
is very little evidence of similarity between the various extreme probabilities within a given
reference period. A different pattern emerges, however, when we examine tests for differ-
ences across reference periods, in Table 4. This latter table reports mixed evidence about
the similarity of average extreme probability depending on the reference period. This re-
sult may be of practical relevance, if different investor groups have different time horizons
when deciding whether a particular event is extreme.
33The series begins in May 1896. Thus, to compute pit(1) for a 12 month reference period, we count the
number of times in June 1897 that the DJIA exceeded 1 standard deviation from the median, calculated from
May 1896 to May 1897. We then do the same for July 1897, where the median and standard deviation are
calculated from June 1896 to June 1897, and so on.
17
4.2 Evidence on Dynamics
The dynamic behavior of extreme probabilities is highly relevant for risk management and
stress testing. We therefore examine the time series behavior of our pit(ω) series. The
results are displayed in Table 5.34 Importantly, except for the very extreme 5-sigma events,
the Q-test of white noise is rejected. This suggests that there are important dynamics in the
likelihood of extreme events. The best-fitting models generally range from AR(1) to AR(3),
although there are a few models with higher lags. Thus, our empirical probabilities seem
to exhibit memory–extreme events cluster over time, regardless of our reference period.
4.3 Evidence on Endogeneity
Now we would like to assess whether pit depends on plausible aspects of economic behav-
ior, suggested by theory. We focus on ranges rather than point estimates of extreme prob-
abilities, since the former are useful as financial ’warning signals’ that indicate whether
the economy is likely to be entering a regime with high levels of extreme events.35 We
divide the empirical probabilities pit into three ranges, Low, Medium and High. Low cor-
responds to empirical probabilities less than 0.33, Medium to the range 0.33 to 0.67, and
High to the range 0.67 to 1. We then estimate a cumulative logistic model for all reference
periods.36 The estimated model shows the effect of each explanatory variable on the like-
lihood of High levels of extreme probabilities. For example, the estimated coefficient on
REALLOAN shows the relation between a one-unit increase in real estate borrowing and
the likelihood of being in a period of High extreme probabilities. Based on the considera-
tions of Gabaix, Gopikrishnan, Plerou, and Stanley (2006) and Montier (2002), we include
dummy variables for low, medium and high levels of liquidity, namely, LIQ0, LIQ1 and
LIQ2, respectively, as well as interaction terms between liquidity and real estate borrow-
34Some series had insufficient variance to compute time series models. This was particularly the case with
the 5-sigma extremes, since much of that series consists of zeros.
35From a statistical viewpoint, the use of ranges is attractive for several reasons. Importantly, estimation of
ranges is valuable for incorporating model uncertainty, as discussed by Granger, White, and Kamstra (1989)
and Hansen (2006). Range based empirical methods have also been used successfully in financial economics,
for example by Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold (2002).
36Logistic regression with k explanatory variables is based on the following empirical model: g(p) =
α+β1X1+ ...+βkXk. The link function g(p) is linearly related to the explanatory variables, and in the case
of logistic regression, the link function is the logit, g(p) = log(p/(1− p)). Thus, in our application, we are
estimating the effect of various explanatory variables on the (log of the) probability of high extremes divided
by the probability of no high extremes. A similar methodology has been used in explaining crises, by Bordo,
Eichengreen, Klingebiel, and Martinez-Peria (2001).
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ing. The results are reported in Tables 6 to 9, which we now discuss.37 We are primarily
interested in the significance rather than sign of our explanatory variables, because we have
no plausible variables for expected costs from equation (7), which could be either negative
or positive. Since 3 sigma events exhibit less variation (mostly zeros and ones), the model
fit for these events is not as good as for the other cases. With the exception of 2-sigma
events in the two year reference period, the models generally work well for 1 and 2 sigma
extremes, as documented by the small p-values for the LR, Score and Wald tests.38
The most striking finding is that for all reference periods, real estate borrowing is signifi-
cantly related at the 5% level to high probability of extremes for at least one specification:
1-sigma events, 2-sigma events, or both. In Table 6, the estimated coefficient on REAL-
LOAN is -21.52, with a p-value of 0.0052. Moreover, in the same table, a low level of
liquidity (LIQ0) is significant for high extremes. This latter result holds for 1 and 2 sigma
events, both individually and in interaction with real estate borrowing. The amount of se-
curitization, SECPCT, is significant only for 2-sigma extremes at the 10 year horizon. The
investor sentiment variable DSENT1, is never significant.39
To summarize our empirical exploration, the main findings on the dynamics of extremes
are very encouraging: extreme probabilities are strongly dynamic and persistent, as docu-
mented in Tables 2 through 5. The evidence on endogenous extremes is somewhat encour-
aging. A cumulative logistic analysis shows that the level of real estate borrowing is related
to high likelihood of extremes for at least one specification in all reference periods. More-
over, current illiquidity may interact with past real estate borrowing to affect the likelihood
of extreme events. These latter findings corroborate the theoretical and anecdotal evidence
of Allen and Gale (2000), Fisher (1933) and Gabaix, Gopikrishnan, Plerou, and Stanley
(2006), and support the idea that extremes may be endogenous.
37The full set of explanatory variables is only available from 1989 to 2005. During this period the 4 and
5 sigma extremes featured only zeros for all reference periods. Therefore we can only estimate and report
estimation results for 1- to 3-sigma extremes.
38These three statistics test the null hypothesis that all the explanatory variables have zero coefficients.
39The estimation reports two intercepts because cumulative logit computes it that way, one less than the
number of categories in the dependent variable
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5 Conclusions
Our paper develops a simple, positive approach to extreme events. We suggest that the
probability of extremes may vary systematically over time, and might be explained and
forecasted on the basis of economic theory. We have four main contributions. First, we
distinguish exogenous from endogenous extremes, the latter of which can be understood
in the framework of externalities. This distinction has immediate policy implications: for
truly exogenous extremes, we must focus on ex post protection, while for endogenous ex-
tremes, we can use economic incentives to entice agents to reduce extremes themselves.
Second, our approach suggests a role for central bank and regulatory intervention. In tack-
ling issues related to economic instability, regulators have at their disposal a set of public
finance tools, in addition to traditional interest rate solutions. Third, we show the ’signa-
ture’ of different types of extremes, and provide insight on their incidence. According to
equation (7), economies are more susceptible to extremes if expected costs are low and
there is a large discrepancy between marginal rates of substitutions for resource borrowers
and lenders. Finally, on the empirical side, we compute extreme probabilities, and discover
that extremes often possess interesting dynamics. Extreme probabilities generally differ
significantly from zero, and have strong autoregressive components, indicating memory in
extremes. Regarding endogeneity, a logistic analysis shows that between 1989 to 2005, real
estate borrowing and (to a smaller extent) market illiquidity can help to explain the likeli-
hood of extremes. In light of our theoretical and empirical findings, it might be plausible
to consider regulatory intervention in an effort to control extreme events.
While our paper describes a method for understanding patterns in the likelihood of ex-
tremes, it does not aim to predict all possible extreme events. The aim is to show that, far
from being random, the probability of some extremes have similar dynamics, and relate to
economic fundamentals. Our research may be seen as a first step towards incorporating
dynamic, endogenous, extremes into standard economic analysis. Acknowledgement of
dynamic extremes may be helpful for risk management. Regarding endogeneity, even if a
channel differs from the one we focus on empirically (borrowing), the message remains:
endogenous extreme events might be prevented using tools from public finance. Impor-
tant extensions include identifying dynamic extremes in other assets, and exploring various
channels of endogenous extremes encountered in practice. Such refinements present an
exciting task for future research.
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Figure 1: Percentage Change in US House Prices.
The figure shows the percentage change in the Case-Shiller US House Price Index, relative to the previous
year. Source: Standard and Poors.
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Figure 2: UK banks’ price of borrowing.
The figure shows the price of interbank borrowing in the UK. The solid (red) line is the 3-month interbank
rate and the dotted (green) line is the base rate. Source: DataStream.
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Table 1: Two Examples of Endogenous Probabilities
Effects felt mainly in one Spillover effects
market or transaction in many markets
Asymmetric Information Moral Hazard
Symmetric or Asymmetric
Information Endogenous Extremes
Figure 3: Sequence of Events.
The figure shows the timing of decisions in our stylized model. r¯ and p¯i are threshold levels of resource
transfers and extreme probability where spillovers to other sectors begin. Endogenous extremes occur during
’easy’ regimes–when it is simple to transfer resources. Exogenous extremes occur during ’hard’ regimes.
c0, c1, c2 include costs related to default, financial instability and aggregate uncertainty.
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Figure 4: Time Series of Extremes
The figure shows a sample of the time series for various levels of extreme probabilities, from 1967 to 2007.
The relevant reference period is 12 months.
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Figure 5: The Distribution of 1-sigma Events.
The histogram shows the empirical probability of Dow-Jones Industrial Average levels that exceed one stan-
dard deviation from the relevant median. The median is calculated over different reference samples, ranging
from 12 months to 120 months.
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Figure 6: The Distribution of 2-sigma Events.
The histogram shows the empirical probability of Dow-Jones Industrial Average levels that exceed two stan-
dard deviations from the relevant median. The median is calculated over different reference samples, ranging
from 12 months to 120 months.
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Figure 7: The Distribution of 3-sigma Events.
The histogram shows the empirical probability of Dow-Jones Industrial Average levels that exceed three
standard deviations from the relevant median. The median is calculated over different reference samples,
ranging from 12 months to 120 months.
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Figure 8: The Distribution of 4-sigma Events.
The histogram shows the empirical probability of Dow-Jones Industrial Average levels that exceed four stan-
dard deviations from the relevant median. The median is calculated over different reference samples, ranging
from 12 months to 120 months.
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Figure 9: The Distribution of 5-sigma events.
The histogram shows the empirical probability of Dow-Jones Industrial Average levels that exceed five stan-
dard deviations from the relevant median. The median is calculated over different reference samples, ranging
from 12 months to 120 months.
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Table 2: Basic Properties of Extreme Probabilities pit(ω)
Panel A: 12-month reference period
Mean Standard P-value for P-value for
Deviation t-test sign rank test
(ω = 1): 0.6288 0.4202 < 0.0001 <0.0001
(ω = 2): 0.2647 0.3806 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(ω = 3): 0.0542 0.1768 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(ω = 4): 0.0098 0.0739 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(ω = 5): 0.0033 0.0437 0.0056 0.0020
Panel B: 24-month reference period
Mean Standard P-value for P-value for
Deviation t-test sign rank test
(ω = 1): 0.6189 0.4439 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(ω = 2): 0.2489 0.3906 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(ω = 3): 0.0517 0.1844 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(ω = 4): 0.0044 0.0502 0.0014 < 0.0001
(ω = 5): 0.0010 0.0291 0.2060 0.5000
Panel C: 60-month reference period
Mean Standard P-value for P-value for
Deviation t-test sign rank test
(ω = 1): 0.5787 0.4680 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
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(ω = 2): 0.2450 0.4083 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(ω = 3): 0.0496 0.1899 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(ω = 4): 0.0026 0.0445 0.0368 0.0313
(ω = 5): 0.0007 0.0259 0.3175 1.000
Panel D: 120-month reference period
Mean Standard P-value for P-value for
Deviation t-test sign rank test
(ω = 1): 0.6038 0.4711 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(ω = 2): 0.2961 0.4413 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(ω = 3): 0.0908 0.2722 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(ω = 4): 0.0086 0.0732 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(ω = 5): 0.0000 0.0000 . .
The table shows stylized facts for the time series of extreme probabilities
pit(ω). As in the text, ω denotes the number of standard deviations away
from the relevant median. The t- and sign rank tests examine whether the
mean differs significantly from zero.
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Table 3: P-values for Test of Differences Within Reference Periods
Panel A: 12-month reference period
1-σ vs 2-σ 1-σ vs 3-σ 1-σ vs 4-σ 1-σ vs 5-σ 2-σ vs 3-σ 2-σ vs 4-σ 2-σ vs 5-σ 3-σ vs 4-σ 3-σ vs 5-σ 4-σ vs 5-σ
t-test: < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
Sign test: < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
SR test: < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
Panel B: 24-month reference period
t-test: < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.0018
Sign test: < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
SR test: < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
Panel C: 60-month reference period
t-test: < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 <0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.0530
Sign test: < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 <0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.0313
SR test: < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 <0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.0313
Panel D: 120-month reference period
t-test: < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 <0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
Sign test: < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 <0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
SR test: < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 <0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
The table shows the p-values from statistical tests for significant differences in the means of our pit(ω) series,
for various levels of extreme events. SR denotes the sign rank test.
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Table 4: P-values for Test of Differences Across Reference Periods
Panel A: 1-σ Events
12- vs 24-month 24- vs 60-month 60- vs 120-month 12- vs 120-month
t-test: 0.6024 0.0032 0.0408 0.1750
Sign test: 0.8438 0.0009 0.0049 0.4969
SR test: 0.6499 0.0028 0.0469 0.0710
Panel B: 2-σ Events
t-test: 0.1012 0.8694 <0.0001 0.0417
Sign test: 0.1198 0.1902 <0.0001 0.6960
SR test: 0.0998 0.9772 <0.0001 0.0146
Panel C: 3-σ Events
t-test: 0.9167 0.9404 <0.0001 <0.0001
Sign test: 0.3580 0.1679 <0.0001 0.9508
SR test: 0.8088 0.7975 <0.0001 <0.0001
Panel D: 4-σ Events
t-test: 0.0073 0.3936 0.0187 0.8629
Sign test: 0.0026 0.0490 0.0023 0.4885
SR test: 0.0004 0.2112 0.0114 0.7465
Panel E: 5-σ Events
t-test: 0.0203 0.2306 0.3175 0.0111
Sign test: 0.0156 0.5000 1.0000 0.0078
SR test: 0.0156 0.5000 1.0000 0.0078
The table shows the p-values from statistical tests for significant differences in the
means of our series, for various levels of extreme events. SR denotes sign rank test.
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Table 5: Time Series properties of Extreme Probabilities
Panel A: 12-month reference period
1-σ 2-σ 3-σ 4-σ 5-σ
Q-test, original series < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 <0.0001 0.4192
Selected Model: AR(2) AR(2) AR(2) AR(2) AR(1)
Q-test of residuals 0.1729 0.0266 0.3694 0.9654 0.9982
Panel B: 24-month reference period
Q-Test, original series < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 <0.0001 1.0000
Selected Model: AR(2) AR(2) AR(2) AR(4) NA
Q-test of residuals 0.0952 0.0949 0.8880 0.2330 NA
Panel C: 60-month reference period
Q-test, original series < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 <0.0001 1.0000
Selected Model: AR(1) AR(4) AR(4) AR(3) NA
Q-test of residuals 0.4002 0.0575 0.0166 0.1698 NA
Panel D: 120-month reference period
Q-test, original series < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 <0.0001 NA
Selected Model: AR(2) AR(1) AR(3) AR(5) NA
Q-test of residuals 0.0327 0.0349 0.2157 0.5157
The table shows the results of time series estimation of the
pit(ω) series, for different reference periods. NA denotes
’not applicable’, where estimation did not converge.
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Table 6: Cumulative Logistic Estimation, 12-month Reference Period
Panel A: 1-σ events
Intercept1 Intercept2 REALLOAN DSENT1 SECPCT LIQ0 LIQ1 REALLOAN*LIQ0 REALLOAN*LIQ1
Coefficient 5.3675 4.5980 -21.5218 0.1487 -2.3985 -5.7905 -1.5121 26.0566 9.5101
(0.0011) (0.0047) (0.0052) (0.2759) (0.6978) (0.0179) (0.4771) (0.0197) (0.3332)
Tests of Overall Fit (p-values): LR 0.0186
Score 0.0175
Wald 0.0409
Panel B: 2-σ events
Coefficient 8.6457 7.9444 -45.0513 -0.0339 -9.3293 -8.0929 -2.9394 39.1506 15.3235
(0.0112) (0.0195) (0.0091) (0.8263) (0.1551) (0.0443) (0.4729) (0.0472) (0.4558)
Tests of Overall Fit (p-values): LR 0.0011
Score 0.0094
Wald 0.0275
Panel C: 3-σ events
Coefficient 8.7419 7.6638 -57.7413 0.2965 -9.3413 -15.1531 -6.2688 68.5561 34.5645
(0.3130) (0.3765) (0.2006) (0.4033) (0.4732) (0.1723) (0.5143) (0.2016) (0.4852)
Tests of Overall Fit (p-values): LR 0.3148
Score 0.4609
Wald 0.5756
The table shows the results of logistic regression estimation, from January 1989 to December 2005. The dependent, categorical variable
is pit(ω), which is ranked as Low (less than 0.33), Medium (between 0.33 and 0.67), and High (above 0.67). DSENT1 is the investor
sentiment measure of Baker and Wurgler (2007). LIQ0 and LIQ1 correspond to low and medium levels of liquidity, SECPCT is the
percentage change in securitized loans, REALLOAN is the ratio of real estate loans to other consumer loans. A chi square statistic is
computed as the squared ratio of each parameter to its standard error, and the corresponding p-values are in parentheses.
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Table 7: Cumulative Logistic Estimation, 24-month Reference Period
Panel A: 1-σ events
Intercept1 Intercept2 REALLOAN DSENT1 SECPCT LIQ0 LIQ1 REALLOAN*LIQ0 REALLOAN*LIQ1
Coefficient 8.0943 7.6624 -32.8161 0.0229 0.2950 -2.7495 -1.8432 11.9173 11.2734
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0003) (0.8768) (0.9685) (0.3271) (0.4599) (0.3483) (0.3182)
Tests of Overall Fit (p-values): LR <.0001
Score <.0001
Wald <.0001
Panel B: 2-σ events
Coefficient 1.9688 1.6283 -15.3030 -0.0169 7.4385 1.5592 -0.1817 -5.0872 1.3811
(0.3934) (0.4802) (0.1751) (0.9135) (0.2383) (0.6483) (0.9515) (0.7540) (0.9245)
Tests of Overall Fit (p-values): LR 0.0851
Score 0.1339
Wald 0.1613
Panel C: 3-σ events
Coefficient -1.4408 -2.3552 -6.4250 0.1366 2.2496 -0.6735 0.3425 4.2006 -2.9245
(0.6920) (0.5189) (0.7127) (0.6338) (0.8520) (0.8974) (0.9489) (0.8624) (0.9094)
Tests of Overall Fit (p-values): LR 0.9911
Score 0.9930
Wald 0.9943
The table shows the results of logistic regression estimation, from January 1989 to December 2005. The dependent, categorical variable
is pit(ω), which is ranked as Low (less than 0.33), Medium (between 0.33 and 0.67), and High (above 0.67). DSENT1 is the investor
sentiment measure of Baker and Wurgler (2007). LIQ0 and LIQ1 correspond to low and medium levels of liquidity, SECPCT is the
percentage change in securitized loans, REALLOAN is the ratio of real estate loans to other consumer loans. P-values based on chi-
square tests are in parentheses.
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Table 8: Cumulative Logistic Estimation, 60-month Reference Period
Panel A: 1-σ events
Intercept1 Intercept2 REALLOAN DSENT1 SECPCT LIQ0 LIQ1 REALLOAN*LIQ0 REALLOAN*LIQ1
Coefficient 16.9786 16.5095 -70.4190 0.1522 -10.5182 -1.8429 2.0033 10.0758 -6.1854
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4344) (0.3580) (0.7002) (0.6823) (0.6377) (0.7765)
Tests of Overall Fit (p-values): LR <.0001
Score <.0001
Wald <.0001
Panel B: 2-σ events
Coefficient 2.9659 2.7202 -18.6782 -0.0187 -0.8247 2.2365 1.8791 -10.9524 -7.0953
(0.1951) (0.2345) (0.0962) (0.9068) (0.8959) (0.5649) (0.5405) (0.5557) (0.6379)
Tests of Overall Fit (p-values): LR 0.0032
Score 0.0099
Wald 0.0326
Panel C: 3-σ events
Coefficient 0.4406 0.00661 -16.0284 0.1180 -6.6053 8.8289 2.9406 -41.4283 -12.1881
(0.9290) (0.9989) (0.5133) (0.7092) (0.5846) (0.3623) (0.6712) (0.3911) (0.7251)
Tests of Overall Fit (p-values): LR 0.4572
Score 0.6365
Wald 0.7028
The table shows the results of logistic regression estimation, from January 1989 to December 2005. The dependent, categorical variable
is pit(ω), which is ranked as Low (less than 0.33), Medium (between 0.33 and 0.67), and High (above 0.67). DSENT1 is the investor
sentiment measure of Baker and Wurgler (2007). LIQ0 and LIQ1 correspond to low and medium levels of liquidity, SECPCT is the
percentage change in securitized loans, REALLOAN is the ratio of real estate loans to other consumer loans. P-values based on chi-
square tests are in parentheses.
36
Table 9: Cumulative Logistic Estimation, 120-month Reference Period
Panel A: 1-σ events
Intercept1 Intercept2 REALLOAN DSENT1 SECPCT LIQ0 LIQ1 REALLOAN*LIQ0 REALLOAN*LIQ1
Coefficient 88.9107 NA -349.3 -0.2846 -86.9502 189.6 79.0265 -834.0 -352.6
(0.4142) NA (0.4126) (0.9322) (0.8750) (0.5211) (0.6861) (0.5032) (0.6674)
Tests of Overall Fit (p-values): LR <.0001
Score <.0001
Wald 0.8770
Panel B: 2-σ events
Coefficient 4.0076 3.9309 -21.7267 0.0876 17.3339 6.0011 3.4082 -25.7645 -17.0596
(0.0612) (0.0662) (0.0367) (0.5570) (0.0204) (0.1275) (0.3536) (0.1638) (0.3492)
Tests of Overall Fit (p-values): LR <.0001
Score <.0001
Wald <.0001
Panel C: 3-σ events
Coefficient 0.0380 -0.2100 -9.2003 0.0761 0.0676 7.7500 3.1538 -37.1530 -15.2701
(0.9885) (0.9367) (0.4716) (0.7288) (0.9933) (0.1886) (0.4639) (0.1975) (0.4732)
Tests of Overall Fit (p-values): LR 0.2074
Score 0.4223
Wald 0.5305
The table shows the results of logistic regression estimation, from January 1989 to December 2005. The dependent, categorical variable
is pit(ω), which is ranked as Low (less than 0.33), Medium (between 0.33 and 0.67), and High (above 0.67). DSENT is the investor
sentiment measure of Baker and Wurgler (2007). LIQ0 and LIQ1 correspond to low and medium levels of liquidity, SECPCT is the
percentage change in securitized loans, REALLOAN is the ratio of real estate loans to other consumer loans. P-values based on chi-
square tests are in parentheses.
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